A new Method
Prior to 2003, the United States did not consider cultural understanding a major issue and considered training on such issues not important. The Iraq War turned this narrative upside down and what at first was considered futile, became one of the most important aspects in accomplishing the mission in the Middle East. Understanding the people of Iraq was not only key to winning the people over but also was used as a weapon to defeat terror groups.
Cultural tools
As we realized that it would take more than just brute force to achieve victory, the cultural tools started to come out. Troops were starting to be trained before deploying as well as during their tours on the various cultural difference and how to overcome them. The U.S. started releasing guides on understanding the different cultures and why the Middle Eastern people act the way they do. Unfortunately some of these documents were very flawed as the writers themselves did not fully understand the cultural inner workings and what drove the people. We also took short-cuts and relied on books, which rather than combated the biases Americans held, instead reinforce them. One of these books is "The Arab Mind" by Raphael-Patai.
In his book, Patai makes many assertions about the "Arab" people and essentially generalizes the way the entire Middle East population acts and thinks. Whitaker (2004) summarizes one specific account when Patai refers to people in "outlying areas" he says that "homosexuality is the rule, and practiced completely in the open." but then in a footnote he says this claim needs to be check out (1).What he doesn't take into account is the numerous different cultures within Iraq and other areas, but also the sub-cultures within the countries themselves. Over time, these tools became better, refined, and had much more thought behind them. Today, it is widely accepted that cultural understanding is not only a tool, but one of our most powerful weapons in fighting terror organizations in the Middle East.
In his book, Patai makes many assertions about the "Arab" people and essentially generalizes the way the entire Middle East population acts and thinks. Whitaker (2004) summarizes one specific account when Patai refers to people in "outlying areas" he says that "homosexuality is the rule, and practiced completely in the open." but then in a footnote he says this claim needs to be check out (1).What he doesn't take into account is the numerous different cultures within Iraq and other areas, but also the sub-cultures within the countries themselves. Over time, these tools became better, refined, and had much more thought behind them. Today, it is widely accepted that cultural understanding is not only a tool, but one of our most powerful weapons in fighting terror organizations in the Middle East.
Training the Iraqi's
Not only is understanding the Iraqi culture important to winning the people over it is also crucial for proper training of the nations military. Many American troops see the Iraqi Army as more of nuisance than anything. Always showing up late, not seeming to pay attention, and constantly screwing up. However, rather than see them as a pest it is important to understand that they are the final push to whether the war will be considered a victory or not. We can't stay in Iraq forever and as we pull out, time will tell whether the training was substantial enough for the Iraqi's to hold there own.
Another lesson learned is that we cannot expect them to learn our methods of fighting and cultural ways without trying to understand theres. These biases we hold make us think that our way is always right, perhaps in the U.S. it is, but not always in Iraq. Leland (2009) lays out a great example of this in his interview with Capt. Sam Allen. The Iraqi security forces had planed a raid on a weapons cache and were going to run the entire operation with the American's provided support if they needed it. However, once it was found out that the weather called for rain, the Iraqi's canceled the operation (1). When you here this, cognitive biases immediately trick your brain into thinking, "really!?, over a little bit of rain?". What you aren't considering is that if the raid was conducted, the troops would have tracked mud all throughout the homes of citizens in the area and would have in turn probably created more enemies than they actually would have arrested (Leland 2009). So before you make a judgment, it is so important to think about why is the decision being made rather just jumping to conclusions, especially when dealing with cultures that you really don't understand.
Another lesson learned is that we cannot expect them to learn our methods of fighting and cultural ways without trying to understand theres. These biases we hold make us think that our way is always right, perhaps in the U.S. it is, but not always in Iraq. Leland (2009) lays out a great example of this in his interview with Capt. Sam Allen. The Iraqi security forces had planed a raid on a weapons cache and were going to run the entire operation with the American's provided support if they needed it. However, once it was found out that the weather called for rain, the Iraqi's canceled the operation (1). When you here this, cognitive biases immediately trick your brain into thinking, "really!?, over a little bit of rain?". What you aren't considering is that if the raid was conducted, the troops would have tracked mud all throughout the homes of citizens in the area and would have in turn probably created more enemies than they actually would have arrested (Leland 2009). So before you make a judgment, it is so important to think about why is the decision being made rather just jumping to conclusions, especially when dealing with cultures that you really don't understand.